Prelude to Appeasement

August 25, 2010 12:24

Our actions — if any — in the Iranian nuclear weapons development controversy cry out to be based on a careful assessment of facts — and a heartless rooting out of assumptions, hidden or otherwise, that may be driving policy.

by Tony Blankley at Rasmussen Reports


Those who are or will be calling for U.S. military action to damage and delay Iran’s ability to develop operational nuclear weapons — that is those for whom it is now 1938 — make a number of assumptions: 1) The Iranian regime intends to develop nuclear weapons; 2) once it has them, being fanatics, they may actually use them against Israel, as they have repeatedly threatened; 3) even if they doesn’t use them, it will change the dynamics of the Middle East by inducing a nuclear arms race between Sunni Muslim countries and Iran, and by giving Iran a huge capacity to intimidate and dominate the region; 4) both Europe and the United States will eventually fall within the missile shadow of a nuclear Iran — thus giving Iran capacity to be a world player and possible precipitator of nuclear war even beyond the Middle East; 5) the regime is inherently hostile and aggressive, particularly against the U.S. and Israel, and will keep pushing until pushed back; and 6) even tough sanctions will not deter Iran — moreover, Russia is too invested in Iran to truly cooperate with us, and even Europe will not enforce tough sanctions.

The Obama administration, on the other hand, holds vastly different assumptions: 1) Iran may actually not want nuclear weapons. 2) If they do want them, Russia will help us stop them. 3) If we settle the Israeli/Palestinian dispute that will reduce any nuclear aspirations Iran may have. 4) If we were to attack Iran, Iran could create more chaos than we can manage. 5) But if Iran did develop their nuclear weapons, we can deter their use by providing a nuclear umbrella for both Arab and Israeli.


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